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INTRODUCTION 
Corporations and businesses make important decisions every day 
that affect their financial viability and market image relative to other 
competitors in a particular industry.  For those organizations that 
produce innovative technologies, the aggregate of the many decisions 
made throughout the various stages of development manifests itself 
through the final product presented to the marketplace or utilized by 
the organization internally.  However, as evidenced by the drastic 
increase in patent infringement cases brought before U.S. courts each 
year (there were 2,120 patent suits filed in 19981 and filings increased 
111% from 1991 to 20002), circumstances in which organizations 
produce inventions that infringe the legal rights of other entities occur 
routinely in the United States. 
U.S. patent laws3 influence the decision-making processes for these 
technology-producing organizations through the economic 
consequences (the costs of litigating an average patent case are 
estimated to be one to four million dollars4) and time costs resulting 
from actual and potential patent infringement litigation, settlements, 
and liability rulings.  Yet despite organizations’ knowledge of the 
possible legal and business repercussions associated with patent 
infringement, a multitude of U.S. court cases addressing this issue 
continue to arise each year.5  Accordingly, a proper analysis of the 
phenomenon of patent infringement prompts the natural inquiry of 
whether firms consciously decide to infringe certain patents as a sound 
business strategy or whether such cases arise spontaneously due to 
incomplete and careless research of prior art by the infringing firms.  
Regardless of what empirical research studies indicate as the most 
frequent explanation,6 patent infringement may remain an effective 
 
 1. Erik Espe, Friendlier Courts, Higher Stakes Unleash Patent Suits, SILICON 
VALLEY/SAN JOSE BUS. J., July 2, 1999, at 1, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/ 
stories/1999/07/05/story4.html. 
 2. Pearl Patent Enforcement and Royalties, Ltd., Patent Infringement Lawsuits:  By the 
Numbers, http://www.pearlltd.com/index6.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2006) (describing the 
growth in patent infringement litigation, the increase in case numbers, and the costs involved 
with patent infringement). 
 3. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000). 
 4. Julia Huston, Litigating Patent Rights in a Down Economy, 32 MASS. LAW. WKLY. 
359 (2003). 
 5. See Espe, supra note 1; Pearl Patent Enforcement and Royalties, Ltd., supra note 2. 
 6. See Jennifer Polse, Comment, Holding the Sovereign’s Universities Accountable for 
Patent Infringement After Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank, 89 CAL. L. REV. 507, 
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business strategy for technology-producing firms, even when not 
employed willfully, due to the inadequate deterrence function of current 
U.S. patent laws. 
I.  APPLICABILITY OF U.S. PATENT INFRINGEMENT LAWS TO 
CORPORATIONS 
A.  Current U.S. Patent Laws Deterring Unintentional Infringement 
U.S. patent laws do not explicitly consider the intention of the 
alleged infringer in determining whether that entity or person is liable 
for patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. §§ 271, 284, 285,7 and the 
“doctrine of equivalents.”8  Consequently, federal courts are not 
explicitly required to consider the fact that a company willfully 
produced an infringing technology when determining its liability or the 
remedy granted to the plaintiff under a facial interpretation of these 
aforementioned laws.9  As a result, the deterrence effect of these patent 
laws works to instill a more comprehensive and careful research effort 
of prior art by inventors in order to discourage and minimize 
unintentional infringement. 
 
519 (2001).  Polse states that “most patent infringement suits allege willful infringement.”  Id.  
Although this demonstrates that most plaintiffs believe a potential patent infringer has 
committed willful infringement, many defendants may not have consciously or intentionally 
infringed another’s patent, including those parties who settle patent infringement claims, 
those who are found not liable for willful infringement by courts, and those who are not 
charged with committing willful infringement. 
 7. But see 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(c).  It is important to note that these indirect 
infringement statutes that protect patent owners against active inducement infringement and 
contributory infringement, respectively, do explicitly consider the intention of the alleged 
infringer in determining whether that entity is liable for patent infringement.  Id.   However, 
this Comment focuses only on direct infringement by corporations; patent laws deterring 
indirect infringement are beyond the scope of this Comment.  See DONALD S. CHISUM ET 
AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS 968–79 (3d ed. 2004) (regarding 
patent laws as deterrents of indirect infringement); see also Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & 
Lomb, Inc., 909 F.2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 
Inc., 911 F.2d 670 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 8. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950) 
(establishing the modern contours of the patent law “doctrine of equivalents”).  In this case, 
the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he theory on which [the ‘doctrine of equivalents’] is 
founded is that ‘if two devices do the same work in substantially the same way, and 
accomplish substantially the same result, they are the same, even though they differ in name, 
form, or shape.’”  Id. at 608 (quoting Union Paper-Bag Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 
(1877)). 
 9. 35 U.S.C. § 271; see Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 605.  The ‘doctrine of equivalents’ does 
not explicitly require courts to consider the intentions of a potential infringer whatsoever.  
See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608; see also discussion supra note 8. 
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Under 35 U.S.C. § 284, the damages assessed by the jury and/or 
judge serve this deterrence function against unintentional infringement 
and are distinct from those awarded in willful infringement cases,10 
except when the unintentional infringement is also considered 
“exceptional” by the court.11  However, the inability of these patent 
laws12 to effectively deter potential infringers from consciously 
developing a strategy to infringe upon a patented technology creates a 
tangential incentive for firms to develop business plans directed at 
violating these laws. 
B.  Current U.S. Patent Laws Deterring Willful Infringement 
Consequently, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has 
begun to recognize the failure of U.S. patent laws and judicial precedent 
to explicitly address the business problems created by willful 
infringement and has responded with a series of decisions aimed at 
directly admonishing such action.13  The pressing need for federal courts 
to adopt a strong policy stance against intentional abuses of U.S. patent 
laws by willful infringers can be traced back to the creation of the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit by Congress in 1982.14  Subsequent to 
its formation, the Federal Circuit proceeded to rule that an infringer has 
a “legal obligation to respect valid patent rights”15 in a concerted effort 
to halt the “widespread disregard of patent rights [that] was 
undermining the national innovation incentive.”16 
 
 10. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 284–285; Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. 
Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 11. 35 U.S.C. §§ 284–285. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1342; L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 
F.2d 1117, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 817 (Fed. Cir. 1992); 
Bott v. Four Star Corp., 807 F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Underwater Devices, Inc. v. 
Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Afros S.P.A. v. Krauss-Maffei Corp., 
671 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Del. 1987). 
 14. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1343; About the Federal Circuit, 
http://www.fedcir.gov/about.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2006); see also Kevin J. Kelly, Placing 
the Burden Back Where It Belongs:  A Proposal to Eliminate the Affirmative Duty from 
Willful Infringement Analyses, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 509, 516 n.51 (2005). 
 15. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1343 (citing Underwater Devices, Inc., 717 F.2d 1380). 
 16. Id. at 1343 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, ADVISORY COMM. ON INDUS. 
INNOVATION, FINAL REPORT (1979)); see also William F. Lee & Lawrence P. Cogswell, III, 
Understanding and Addressing the Unfair Dilemma Created by the Doctrine of Willful Patent 
Infringement, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 424–25 (2004) (stating that the “purpose of the [willful 
infringement] doctrine [is] . . .  to act as a ‘deterrent[] to blatant, blind, willful infringement of 
valid patents’”). 
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Interestingly, however, the Federal Circuit has provided neither an 
express definition for willful infringement, which could be applied to all 
patent infringement cases, nor statutory authority, which explicitly 
prohibits such actions.17  Instead, the Federal Circuit derived its 
authority to pronounce willful infringement as contrary to U.S. patent 
law solely from analogizing that the common law principle disfavoring 
an intentional disregard of legal rights should apply not only to civil 
laws, but patent laws as well.18  In fact, the only statutory authority 
associated with the Federal Circuit’s application of the principle of 
willful infringement is in reference to damages and remedies and not the 
actual wrongful conduct.19  This strongly suggests that the judicial 
doctrine against willful infringement is fundamentally premised upon 
deterrence of intentional infringement through a primarily damages-
based approach, despite suggestions otherwise by the Federal Circuit.20 
However, adding to the convoluted and tenuous derivation of the 
concept of willful infringement by the Federal Circuit is the absence of 
any reference to willful or intentional infringement by either the 
damages or remedies statutes addressed under 35 U.S.C. § 284 and 35 
U.S.C. § 285, respectively.  As a result, a judge is entitled to apply § 284 
in assessing “increased” damages for all infringement judgments, 
including willful infringement,21 and to apply § 285 in awarding 
attorneys’ fees because the Federal Circuit has ruled that willful 
infringement constitutes “exceptional” infringement under the statute.22  
 
 17. See, e.g., Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1342.  In confirming that neither the Supreme 
Court nor the Federal Circuit has provided an express definition for willful infringement, 
which could be applied to all patent infringement cases, 
the Supreme Court has observed that “[t]he word ‘willful’ is widely used in the law, 
and, although it has not by any means been given a perfectly consistent 
interpretation it is generally understood to refer to conduct that is not merely 
negligent,” . . . [and] the Court [has cited] conventional definitions such as 
“voluntary,” “deliberate,” and “intentional.” 
Id. (first alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Stephanie Pall, 
Note, Willful Patent Infringement:  Theoretically Sound?  A Proposal to Restore Willful 
Infringement to Its Proper Place Within Patent Law, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 659, 698 (2006) 
(advocating for the adoption of a more “consistent definition of willful patent infringement”). 
 18. See Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1342 (stating that “[t]he concept of ‘willful 
infringement’ is not simply a conduit for enhancement of damages; it is a statement that 
patent infringement, like other civil wrongs, is disfavored, and intentional disregard of legal 
rights warrants deterrence”). 
 19. See, e.g., id. at 1342 (stating that the “[r]emedy for willful infringement is founded 
on 35 U.S.C. § 284 . . . and 35 U.S.C. § 285”); see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 284–285 (2000). 
 20. See supra note 17. 
 21. 35 U.S.C. § 284. 
 22. Id. § 285; Gentry Gallery v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1998); 
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Consequently, the relatively confusing and tenuous statutory foundation 
for willful infringement liability, damages, and remedies may serve to 
support intentional patent infringement as a viable business strategy. 
While the only U.S. patent laws to exhibit any deterrence effect 
upon potential infringers are the aforementioned § 284 and § 285 
statutes, the Federal Circuit has created a more sophisticated test for 
determining whether willful infringement has occurred.23  This test is 
beneficial to both the federal courts and patent lawyers24 because it adds 
substance and certainty to the general judicial philosophy that infringers 
who intentionally disregard the patent rights of other inventors should 
be punished.25  However, this test is limited in its capabilities because it 
 
Mach. Corp. of Am. v. Gullfiber AB, 774 F.2d 467, 470 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Daniel A. Crane, 
Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits:  Antitrust Rules and Economic 
Implications, 54 FLA. L. REV. 747, 772 n.109 (2002); Thomas L. Irving et al., A Year in 
Review:  The Federal Circuit’s Patent Decisions of 1993, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1259, 1404 (1994); 
Jared Goff, Comment, The Unpredictable Scope of the Waiver Resulting from the Advice-of-
Counsel Defense to Willful Infringement, 1998 BYU L. REV. 213, 216 n.19 (1998). 
 23. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1992).  But see Knorr-Bremse, 383 
F.3d at 1341; Trading Techs. Int’l v. eSpeed, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 834, 838–39 (N.D. Ill. 2006).  
It should be noted that the Federal Circuit and (more recently) the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, have held the traditional judicial 
interpretation of one of the elements of the Read factors test to be invalid.  See Knorr-
Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1344; Trading Techs. Int’l, 431 F. Supp. 2d at 838–39.  More specifically, 
the Federal Circuit deviated from the traditional Read holding by ruling that “no adverse 
inference that an opinion of counsel was or would have been unfavorable flows from an 
alleged infringer’s failure to obtain or produce an exculpatory opinion of counsel.”  Knorr-
Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1341; see also Trading Techs. Int’l, 431 F. Supp. 2d at 838.  However, the 
other elements of the Read holding remain valid law.  Read, 970 F.2d at 826–28; see Knorr-
Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1342–43; Applera Corp. v. MJ Research Inc., 372 F. Supp. 2d 233, 235 (D. 
Conn. 2005). 
 24. See Michael D. Kaminski, Effective Management of U.S. Patent Litigation (Oct. 26, 
2005), http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_s31Publications/FileUpload137/2941/Effective%20 
Management%20of%20US%20Patent%20Litigation.pdf.  This litigation strategy article 
addresses the application of the Read factors test by a practicing attorney for use in advising 
clients regarding willful patent infringement issues.  Id. at 14–19; see also Knorr-Bremse, 383 
F.3d at 1343 (“Fundamental to determination of willful infringement is the duty to act in 
accordance with law.”).  In Knorr-Bremse, the Federal Circuit also noted the efforts of past 
courts in “stress[ing] the legal obligation to respect valid patent rights.”  Knorr-Bremse, 383 
F.3d at 1343 (citing Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983)). 
 25. See David Hricik, Remedies of the Infringer:  The Use by the Infringer of Implied and 
Common Law Federal Rights, State Law Claims, and Contract to Shift Liability for 
Infringement of Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1027, 1056 
(stating that the legislative purpose of the Patent Act is to seek “to prevent contributory and 
induced infringement and [punish] those who act in intentional disregard of the Patent Act”); 
Carol Johns, Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp.:  A Step in 
the Right Direction for Willful Infringement, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 69, 84 (2005); Kelly, 
supra note 14, at 530 n.157; Joshua Stowell, Willful Infringement and the Evidentiary Value of 
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is used by the courts only to classify infringement as intentional and 
does not directly serve a deterrence function. 
Expanding upon the general judicial doctrine that willfulness is to be 
determined in “consideration of the totality of the circumstances,”26 the 
Federal Circuit determined that courts should consider nine factors 
established in Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc. that include: 
(1) whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design 
of another; (2) whether the infringer, when he knew of the 
other’s patent protection, investigated the scope of the patent 
and formed a good-faith belief that it was invalid or that it was 
not infringed; . . . (3) the infringer’s behavior as a party to the 
litigation[;] . . . (4) [d]efendant’s size and financial condition[;] (5) 
[c]loseness of the case[;] (6) [d]uration of defendant’s 
misconduct[;] (7) [r]emedial action by the defendant[;] (8) 
[d]efendant’s motivation for harm[; and] (9) [w]hether defendant 
attempted to conceal its misconduct.27 
If the judge or jury determines that an infringer’s actions qualify as 
willful in consideration of these nine factors, then the judge may 
proceed to punish the infringer under the damages and remedies 
statutes.28 
II.  ANALYSIS OF INADEQUATE PROTECTIONS OF U.S. PATENT 
INFRINGEMENT LAWS TO PATENT OWNERS 
When considering the current U.S. patent laws prohibiting 
infringement, the federal courts’ reliance upon the aforementioned 
statutes29 as the principal deterrent against potential infringers30 may 
prove to be both misguided and ineffective.31  This is because these 
 
Opinion Letters After Knorr-Bremse v. Dana, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 5 (2005) (stating 
that “[t]he purposes of finding willful infringement and the subsequent award of enhanced 
damages are meant to punish infringers for deliberately breaking the law and to make the 
policy statement that patent infringement is ‘disfavored’”). 
 26. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1342. 
 27. Read, 970 F.2d at 827 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
 28. 35 U.S.C. §§ 284–285 (2000); Read, 970 F.2d at 826–28. 
 29. 35 U.S.C. §§ 284–285. 
 30. The previously identified federal statutes are characterized as being the principal 
deterrent against potential infringers because these are the statutes under which federal 
courts derive their authority to assess liability for a party that has committed patent 
infringement.  The Read factors test is a judicial assessment utilized by courts to determine 
whether a party has committed willful patent infringement, and therefore, may serve as an 
implicit deterrent against potential infringers, instead of an explicit deterrent.  See Read, 970 
F.2d at 827. 
 31. See Johns, supra note 25, at 70–71 (stating that “[n]umerous commentators have 
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statutes fail to adequately address and resolve the business innovation 
problems that the judicial concept of willful infringement should work 
to combat.32  The Federal Circuit and Congress have failed to 
adequately address one of the primary problems for which that court 
was originally created;33 the reasons for this failure are outlined here. 
A.  Inadequate Protections Afforded by Statutory Damages and 
Remedies to U.S. Patent Owners 
First, the statutory damages34 and remedies35 that the federal courts 
may apply to those liable for willful infringement are exactly the same as 
the potential damages and remedies that can be applied to all 
“exceptional” patent infringement cases.36  These maximum damages 
and remedies imposed upon a liable party in both “exceptional” and 
willful infringement cases are statutorily limited to “up to three times 
the amount found or assessed”37 plus “reasonable attorney fees to the 
prevailing party.”38  Therefore, when analyzed from a damages-based 
approach, the judicial concept of willful infringement serves a deterrent 
function only in the absence of any other action that could be labeled as 
“exceptional” infringement.39 
For example, a potential patent infringer may be adequately 
deterred from committing willful infringement because the corporation 
knows that it may only be assessed unintentional infringement 
damages40 if the court finds liability.  Conversely, the same potential 
patent infringer may not be deterred whatsoever from committing 
 
criticized the modern willfulness doctrine, contending that willfulness charges do not 
effectively deter direct copying or punish truly culpable behavior and that the doctrine 
creates unhealthy incentives for industry as well as patent lawyers”). 
 32. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  See generally Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 
F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 33. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1343 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 16). 
 34. 35 U.S.C. § 284. 
 35. Id. § 285. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. § 284. 
 38. Id. § 285.  The federal courts have interpreted the concept of willful infringement to 
constitute “exceptional” infringement for purposes of the application of § 285 to cases 
involving willful patent infringement.  See Gentry Gallery v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 
1480 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Mach. Corp. of Am. v. Gullfiber AB, 774 F.2d 467, 470 (Fed. Cir. 1985); 
Crane, supra note 22, at 772 n.109; Irving et al., supra note 22, at 1404; Goff, supra note 22, at 
216 n.19. 
 39. 35 U.S.C. § 284. 
 40. Id. § 285. 
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willful infringement if it knows that it may likely be assessed exactly the 
same amount of “enhanced”41 liability whether or not the court finds 
willful infringement.  A scenario illustrative of the second example is 
where the corporation knows it is likely to be assessed the maximum 
statutory amount for “exceptional”42 infringement liability by the court, 
effectively prohibiting the court from assessing any additional damages 
for willful infringement because the statutory maximum in damages has 
already been assessed.  Accordingly, the absence of a separate or 
additional statutory penalty for willful infringement equates to an 
inability of U.S. patent laws to provide any deterrence for intentional 
patent infringers in the many cases where those infringers also commit 
other acts of “exceptional” infringement.43 
B.  Inadequate Protections Afforded by the Read Factors Test to U.S. 
Patent Owners 
Furthermore, an additional inadequacy of current U.S. patent laws is 
the broad opportunity for alleged infringers to litigate around claims of 
willful infringement by arguing that the preponderance of the evidence 
does not meet the Read factors for willful infringement44 and that the 
 
 41. Id. §§ 284–285. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id.  Since neither § 284 nor § 285 expressly address appropriate damages or 
remedies for willful infringement, a party found liable for patent infringement by a court 
could be assessed the maximum penalty of “three times the amount found or assessed” plus 
reasonable attorney fees for any “exceptional” infringement conduct, which does not 
constitute willful infringement.  If a court has thus already addressed the statutorily allowable 
maximum penalty to a party found liable for patent infringement, it may not assess any 
additional penalty if it also determines that the same party committed willful infringement in 
addition to other acts of “exceptional” infringement.  Therefore, the inclusion of an express 
provision in both § 284 and § 285 would allow a court to also assess additional penalties for 
willful infringement under such circumstances as previously described.  See supra notes 34–42 
and accompanying text. 
 44. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992).  Since the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s decision in Read, federal courts are now to apply the Read 
factors test while considering the totality of the circumstances of a given case as a tool for 
determining whether an alleged infringer has committed willful infringement.  Therefore, if a 
defendant is able to demonstrate that the preponderance of the evidence (in consideration of 
the totality of the circumstances) does not satisfy the Read factors test, then courts should not 
find the defendant liable for willful infringement.  See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer 
Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Read, 970 F.2d 
at 827.  However, courts could still determine that the conduct in question constitutes 
unintentional (non-willful) infringement.  See Pall, supra note 17, at 670–71 (stating that 
“[c]onsequently, the Federal Circuit has devoted most of its willful infringement case law to 
teasing out the particularities surrounding [the Read factors,]” supporting the ability of patent 
attorneys to litigate cases involving willful infringement on the basis of the Read factors). 
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infringers’ actions constitute mere unintentional infringement.  One 
primary problem associated with the Federal Circuit’s standard for 
willful infringement45 is its unwillingness to adopt a judicial definition for 
this concept.46  Instead of establishing a concise definition delineating 
what infringing activities constitute willful infringement, the Federal 
Circuit chose to create a non-exhaustive list of factors for courts to 
consider in determining this type of liability.47  The absence of a precise 
definition for willful infringement contributes to the illegitimacy, 
confusion, and uncertainty of this legal concept because alleged 
infringers possess an increased opportunity to create doubt as to liability 
for an inadequately defined legal claim. 
Also, several deficiencies exist regarding the Read factors for willful 
infringement,48 which may ease the ability for alleged infringers to 
litigate around this test.  For example, the list is non-exhaustive, it does 
not explicitly dictate the relative weight that courts should give to each 
factor, and it does not indicate which or how many factors must be 
satisfied for willful infringement liability to be assessed.49  The indefinite 
nature of this test allows for arguments against liability to be made 
because corporations and patent attorneys will not know what other 
factors courts may consider or the type or quantity of evidence 
indicating willful infringement that is required. 
Additionally, simply because the Federal Circuit has identified these 
aforementioned nine Read factors50 as important considerations to 
weigh in determining whether an alleged infringer’s conduct constitutes 
willful infringement,51 this does not equate to the test being infallible or 
the most effective assessment available to the courts.  Importantly, 
federal courts are required to assess whether willful infringement has 
occurred based on “‘the totality of the circumstances’” of each 
particular case presented.52  The three following factors, which the 
 
 45. Read, 970 F.2d at 827. 
 46. See Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1342; see also Pall, supra note 17, at 698. 
 47. Read, 970 F.2d at 827. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 826–28. 
 50. Id. at 827. 
 51. Id. at 826–27. 
 52. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana 
Corp. (Knorr-Bremse II), 133 F. Supp. 2d 843, 863 (E.D. Va. 2001)).  The relative importance 
of the Read factors test and the manner in which federal courts are to apply each of these 
factors to patent infringement cases is entirely fact-specific for each individual case, with the 
list of factors being non-exhaustive.  Id.; Read, 970 F.2d at 827. 
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Federal Circuit incorporated from previous federal court decisions into 
the Read factors test,53 could be improved to enhance their effectiveness:  
(1) “whether the infringer, when he knew of the other’s patent 
protection, investigated the scope of the patent and formed a good-faith 
belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed”;54 (2) “whether the 
infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design of another”;55 and (3) 
“[r]emedial action by the defendant.”56 
More specifically, several weaknesses associated with these three 
particular Read factors are identified as follows.  First, an alleged 
infringer can now satisfy the investigation and good-faith requirement 
of the first identified Read factor fairly easily after the Knorr-Bremse 
and Trading Technologies International v. eSpeed, Inc. rulings by the 
Federal Circuit and the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois, Eastern Division, respectively.57  For instance, the Federal 
Circuit had previously interpreted this investigation and good-faith 
requirement to impose an “affirmative duty” upon a potential infringer 
to “seek and obtain competent legal advice from counsel before the 
initiation of any possible infringing activity.”58 
Under this formerly imposed duty,59 however, a corporation that 
may have sought to willfully infringe a patent could have hired a patent 
attorney for legal advice, and, in turn, failed to adhere to that advice 
since corporations do not have an obligation to follow the counsel of 
every hired attorney.  Likewise, attorneys cannot force a client 
corporation to follow his or her advice and adhere to the law.  Under 
such a scenario, the corporation’s actions would have easily satisfied the 
previously enforced requirements of the first identified Read factor,60 yet 
the corporation may still have decided to engage in willful infringement. 
 
 53. Read, 970 F.2d at 827; see Bott v. Four Star Corp., 807 F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 
1986); Intra Corp. v. Hamar Laser Instruments, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 1420, 1439 (E.D. Mich. 
1987). 
 54. See Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1341; see also supra note 23 and accompanying text 
for a qualification of this particular Read factor. 
 55. Read, 970 F.2d at 827. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1337; Trading Techs. Int’l v. eSpeed, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 
834 (N.D. Ill. 2006). 
 58. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1343; Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen 
Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389–90 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 
988 F.2d 1117, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Andrew Corp. v. Beverly Mfg. Co., 415 F. Supp. 2d 919, 
927 (N.D. Ill. 2006). 
 59. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1343. 
 60. Read, 970 F.2d at 827. 
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Interestingly, the federal courts have recently retreated61 from this 
formerly imposed “affirmative duty”62 and have subsequently increased 
the ease with which an alleged infringer may now satisfy the 
investigation and good-faith requirement of the first identified Read 
factor.63  This recent change in the law is significant because now “no 
adverse inference that an opinion of counsel was or would have been 
unfavorable flows from an alleged infringer’s failure to obtain or 
produce an exculpatory opinion of counsel.”64  In fact, this deviation 
evidences a direct contradiction by the Federal Circuit in that any 
deterrence effect, which may have once existed under this Read factor, 
appears to have vanished.65 
Furthermore, although it may be more difficult for a corporation to 
argue against liability under the second identified factor, a potential 
willful infringer could still have success demonstrating that it did not 
deliberately copy an idea or design.66  For instance, a corporation could 
deny deliberately copying a patent and instead argue that it “made a 
good faith effort to design around the patented invention” as a 
legitimate defense to this element of willful infringement.67  Also, a 
 
 61. See id. at 828 (stating that the “affirmative duty normally entails obtaining advice of 
legal counsel although the absence of such advice does not mandate a finding of willfulness”).  
But see Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1345 (stating that “[a]lthough there continues to be ‘an 
affirmative duty of due care to avoid infringement of the known patent rights of 
others,’ . . . the failure to obtain an exculpatory opinion of counsel shall no longer provide an 
adverse inference or evidentiary presumption that such opinion would have been 
unfavorable”).  See generally Steven C. Cherny et al., 2004 Patent Law Decisions of the 
Federal Circuit, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 941, 1152 (2005); Johns, supra note 25, at 86 (stating that 
“[t]he finder of fact will no longer be able to presume malicious intent based on an accused 
infringer’s failure to consult counsel or claim privilege”); Harold C. Wegner, Developments in 
Patent Law 2004, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 24 (2004). 
 62. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1337; Trading Techs. Int’l, 431 F. Supp. 2d 834. 
 63. See Read, 970 F.2d at 827; see also supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 64. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1341; see also Read, 970 F.2d at 816; Trading Techs. Int’l, 
431 F. Supp. 2d at 838. 
 65. See Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1344; Trading Techs. Int’l, 431 F. Supp. 2d at 834; see 
also Johns, supra note 25, at 87 (stating that “[t]ime will tell just how safe competitors are 
from the adverse inference in light of Knorr-Bremse IV.  The court left much of willfulness 
doctrine, and its resulting uncertainty, intact” and emphasizing the uncertainty surrounding 
the change in judicial interpretation of this Read factor); Harold A. Borland, Comment, The 
Affirmative Duty to Exercise Due Care on Willful Patent Infringement Cases:  We Still Want It, 
6 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 176, 185 (2005) (stating that “there is no evidence that the 
imposition of the duty and the corresponding threat of enhanced damages actually has any 
effect of deterrence,” which directly contradicts the Federal Circuit’s aim of deterring willful 
infringement). 
 66. Read, 970 F.2d at 827. 
 67. See Edwin H. Taylor & Glenn E. Von Tersch, A Proposal to Shore Up the 
Foundation of Patent Law that the Underwater Line Eroded, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. 
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corporation could claim that it developed an invention independently 
without deliberately copying another corporation’s design, as many 
technology-producing firms conduct research simultaneously in the 
same scientific fields. 
Although independent invention is not a valid defense to 
unintentional patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271, it would be a 
perfectly effective defense to willful infringement under the Read 
factors test because one of the elements takes into consideration 
“whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design of 
another.”68  Additionally, a potential willful infringer attempting to 
circumvent the willful infringement test could argue that it merely 
combined several elements into an invention that is similar to other 
patents, but did not deliberately copy any designs or ideas.69  Hence, 
under these aforementioned possibilities, a corporation’s actions could 
satisfy the requirements of the second identified Read factor,70 yet the 
corporation could still choose to engage in willful infringement. 
Moreover, a potentially infringing corporation could also satisfy the 
third identified factor for indicating willful infringement,71 which would 
weigh in favor of the defendant corporation in assessing willful 
infringement liability.  Specifically, the Read factor of “[r]emedial action 
by the defendant” is the previously identified third factor for a court to 
consider in determining whether a defendant is liable for willful 
infringement that could be improved for an overall increased 
effectiveness of the Read test.72  This factor includes an assessment of a 
potential infringer’s conduct after the plaintiff has filed a suit for willful 
infringement.73 
 
L.J. 721, 727 (1998) (stating that a reduction in exposure to patent liability “can occur through 
licensing or designing around the patent”); see also Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 823 
F.2d 1538, 1546–47 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 68. Read, 970 F.2d at 827. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.; see Bott v. Four Star Corp., 807 F.2d 1567, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Intra Corp. v. 
Hamar Laser Instruments, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 1420, 1439 (E.D. Mich. 1987). 
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Both the Federal Circuit74 and federal district courts75 have only 
considered conduct by a defendant to a lawsuit that has changed from 
the status quo76 in a manner adverse to the plaintiff as being detrimental 
evidence under the aforementioned third Read factor.77  An example of 
remedial conduct where a federal court has found a change from the 
status quo in a manner adverse to the plaintiff involved a case where 
approximately eighty percent of the defendant corporation’s total 
infringing sales occurred after the plaintiff filed suit.78  Another such 
case involved a defendant corporation that assigned two patents at issue 
in the suit to a subsidiary in an effort to avoid liability after the 
infringement suit was filed.79 
Accordingly, in order to successfully satisfy the requirements of this 
third Read factor, a corporation could simply argue that it has complied 
with the principle of a court issued stay of injunction by preserving the 
status quo of its potentially infringing actions.80  Such a claim, if argued 
successfully, would absolve a defendant corporation from liability when 
considering only the “remedial action” third element because courts 
follow the generally accepted principle that a defendant’s preservation 
of the status quo during a stay of injunction is a valid defense to an 
indication of willfully infringing conduct.81  Therefore, current U.S. 
patent laws afford inadequate protections to patent owners due to the 
ineffective deterrent function of the relevant statutes82 and corporations’ 
ability to navigate around the Read factors test83 in an effort to seek 
increased profits. 
 
 74. Bott, 807 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 75. Afros S.P.A. v. Krauss-Maffei Corp., 671 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Del. 1987).  In this case, 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware ruled that the defendant’s willful 
infringement of the plaintiff’s patent was to be imputed to its wholly owned subsidiary.  Id.  In 
reaching its decision, the district court considered the fact that the defendant assigned two of 
its patents to a subsidiary after the lawsuit had been filed.  Id. at 1460. 
 76. Bott, 807 F.2d at 1573. 
 77. See Read, 970 F.2d at 827. 
 78. Bott, 807 F.2d at 1573. 
 79. Afros, 671 F. Supp. at 1459–60. 
 80. See Bott, 807 F.2d at 1573. 
 81. Id. 
 82. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271, 284–285 (2000); see also Mark A. Lemley & Raggesh K. Tangri, 18 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1111 (2003) (stating that “[t]he fact that damages in many patent 
cases will be limited to a reasonable royalty creates problems of deterrence”); Borland, supra 
note 65. 
 83. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see supra notes 43–44 
and accompanying text. 
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III.  PROPOSAL FOR CHANGES TO CURRENT U.S. PATENT 
INFRINGEMENT LAWS FOR UNIVERSAL FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
ADOPTION 
Based upon the previous analysis identifying the many weaknesses 
of current U.S. patent laws in effectively deterring corporations from 
profiting by committing willful infringement, new changes in these laws 
are needed to more successfully promote the intentions of Congress as 
well as the Federal Circuit’s intentions to inhibit this phenomenon.84  
Accordingly, this author proposes three distinct actions, which should 
be taken by these federal bodies in order to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of U.S. patent laws in deterring willful infringement by 
corporations.  This three-part proposal includes:  (1) adoption of a 
precise legal definition for willful patent infringement by the Federal 
Circuit; (2) creation by Congress of more stringent patent damages 
statutes, which apply specifically to cases of willful infringement; and (3) 
adoption by the Federal Circuit of a test or standard for identifying 
willful infringement, which is stricter and more effective than the 
current Read factors test.85 
First, the Federal Circuit has consciously avoided the creation and 
adoption of a precise definition for the legal concept of willful patent 
infringement for reasons that are not entirely clear.86  The Federal 
Circuit’s creation of an express definition for willful infringement would 
improve the existing patent laws in this area by enhancing the legitimacy 
of this legal concept, providing clear notice of the law to potential 
infringers, and clarifying and solidifying the legal foundation and origin87 
of this concept.  However, if the Federal Circuit does not believe that it 
possesses the responsibility for drafting and adopting a legal definition 
for willful patent infringement, then Congress should take it upon itself 
to enact a statutory patent law that provides such an explicit definition 
for the courts to follow. 
 
 84. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 16); Underwater Devices, 
Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 85. Read, 970 F.2d at 827. 
 86. See, e.g., Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1342; see also Kaminski, supra note 24. 
 87. See Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1342.  It should be noted, as previously mentioned in 
this Comment, that the Federal Circuit derives its authority to pronounce willful infringement 
as contrary to U.S. patent law solely from analogizing that the common law principle 
disfavoring an intentional disregard of legal rights should apply not only to civil laws, but 
patent laws as well.  Therefore, adoption by the Federal Circuit of an explicit definition for 
the concept of willful patent infringement would create an identifiable origin for this concept 
within the field of patent law.  See supra Part I. 
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Second, Congress should enact statutory patent laws to delineate 
effective damages and remedies,88 specifically for cases where courts find 
the defendant liable for willful patent infringement.  Most importantly, 
such statutes should include provisions that allow courts to assess 
damages89 for willful infringement in addition to damages assessed for 
any other finding of patent infringement liability or other civil liabilities.  
If courts possessed the ability to assess damages for cases involving 
willful infringement liability in addition to those assessed for any other 
liabilities, as this proposal suggests, then patent infringement laws would 
be much more effective at performing a deterrence function against 
willful infringement. 
This proposal differs from the current patent infringement damages 
and remedies statutes in that the current statutes only allow for a court’s 
assessment of liability for up to three times the base liability found plus 
reasonable attorneys’ fees for all instances of “exceptional” 
infringement.90  Accordingly, in cases where the court finds the 
defendant liable for both willful infringement and another act of 
“exceptional” infringement, the court is statutorily limited to assessing 
only up to three times the base liability found plus reasonable attorneys’ 
fees because willful infringement is considered an act of “exceptional” 
infringement by courts.91  However, under this new proposal, courts 
would possess the ability to assess additional damages for infringement 
cases where the court finds both willful infringement and other acts of 
“exceptional” infringement.  An additional modification to improve the 
deterrence function of the patent statutes against willful infringement 
could also include an increased maximum monetary penalty beyond 
three times the base liability found,92 which courts may assess in such 
circumstances.  Therefore, this proposal would increase the deterrence 
effect of patent laws against willful infringement through enhanced 
 
 88. A modified remedies statute should include a specific provision to award reasonable 
attorneys’ fees where a court finds willful infringement, despite the fact that the current 
remedies statute already awards such a remedy, in order for the modified remedies statute to 
serve an effective deterrence function against willful infringement.  See 35 U.S.C. § 285 
(2000). 
 89. Courts should be allowed to assess only additional damages, and not additional 
remedies, in cases where the defendant is found liable for willful infringement because it is 
not appropriate or equitable for a court to assess any remedy in addition to that of reasonable 
attorneys’ fees, which are already assessed where “exceptional” infringement is found.  See id. 
 90. Id. §§ 284–285. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. § 284. 
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statutory penalties, which allow for the assessment of both additional 
and increased maximum monetary awards. 
Third, the Federal Circuit should adopt a test or standard for 
identifying willful infringement that is stricter and more effective than 
the current Read factors test.93  The adoption of such a test by the 
Federal Circuit would contribute to enhancing the deterrence effect of 
U.S. patent laws against willful infringement in several ways.  A stricter 
factors test for identifying acts of willful infringement would decrease 
the opportunity for and freedom with which potential willful infringers 
may attempt to modify their infringing conduct and present legal 
defenses for patent infringement, which they knew to be willful.  
Moreover, such action by the Federal Circuit would increase the 
effectiveness of willful infringement laws by instituting a shift from a 
remedies-based approach to a facially prohibitive approach.94  
Accordingly, U.S. patents laws would deem specific acts of willfully 
infringing conduct illegal, regardless of the impact that the various 
patent remedy statutes would have on deterring, identifying, and 
penalizing willful infringement. 
For example, the Federal Circuit could initiate such a shift in 
approach by modifying the three previously identified Read factors for 
courts to consider in willful infringement liability cases for improved 
effectiveness.95  The first of these factors considers “whether the 
infringer, when he knew of the other’s patent protection, investigated 
the scope of the patent and formed a good-faith belief that it was invalid 
or that it was not infringed.”96  This first factor could become more 
effective by instead requiring courts to consider only whether the 
infringer knew of the plaintiff’s patent protection.  Such a change would 
make this factor stricter by eliminating the good-faith belief arguments, 
which potential willful infringers may attempt to construct. 
Additionally, a similarly effective change to the second identified 
Read factor could involve deleting the word “deliberately” from the 
requirement that courts consider “whether the infringer deliberately 
copied the ideas or design of another.”97  This modification would 
 
 93. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 94. See Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 763, 791 (2002) (stating that “[o]ptimal deterrence is achieved when the penalties 
are high and the enforcement costs are low because this produces the most compliance at the 
lowest cost to society”).  See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 284–285. 
 95. See Read, 970 F.2d at 827. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
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increase the effectiveness of the second element by indicating that a 
copied idea or design is intrinsically “deliberately” copied.  Even if a 
defendant corporation attempted to provide the defense that its idea or 
design was independently derived, such an argument would not be 
covered under this second element because an independently created 
idea or design could be construed by courts to not constitute an act of 
copying. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Federal Circuit could 
create a standard that is stricter than the current third identified Read 
factor.98  This third factor delineates that courts must weigh the 
“[r]emedial action by the defendant” with an emphasis to be placed on 
whether the defendant’s actions deviated from the status quo after the 
patent infringement suit was filed.99  In order to increase the 
effectiveness of this factor, the Federal Circuit should eliminate the 
corollary, which contemplates whether the defendant’s actions deviated 
from the status quo after filing of the suit.100  Such a change would 
greatly benefit plaintiffs to willful infringement suits because it would 
prevent defendants who successfully demonstrate that their status quo 
did not change from being absolved from liability under the third 
element.101  Accordingly, these defendants who were pocketing the same 
high level of profits prior to and after the willful infringement suit filing 
would benefit from a valid defense for no liability under the current 
third factor standard.102  Conversely, the modified third factor would 
weigh against the defendant for a failure to take appropriate remedial 
action while maintaining a high profit level. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, as a result of the ineffectiveness of current U.S. patent 
laws in deterring and penalizing patent infringers, particularly 
corporations, from committing willful infringement and potentially 
utilizing such actions as an integral part of a business model, new 
changes in these laws are demanded in order to realize the goals of 
Congress and the Federal Circuit for preventing willful infringement.  
The most efficient and forceful mechanism for instituting these greatly 
needed modifications consists of a three-pronged proposal, which 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. See id.; Bott v. Four Star Corp., 807 F.2d 1567, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 100. See Bott, 807 F.2d at 1573–74. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See Read, 970 F.2d at 827; Bott, 807 F.2d  at 1573. 
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includes:  (1) adoption of a precise legal definition for willful patent 
infringement by the Federal Circuit; (2) action by Congress to create 
more stringent patent damages statutes, which apply specifically to cases 
of willful infringement; and (3) adoption by the Federal Circuit of a test 
or standard for identifying willful infringement, which is stricter and 
more effective than the current Read factors test.  The benefits of this 
proposal include an enhanced deterrent effect against corporations from 
committing willful infringement when these entities believe they could 
profit from such actions and detrimental financial consequences for 
those corporations who continue to engage in willful infringement 
without deference to the potential repercussions.  Consequently, federal 
adoption of such a proposal would initiate a return to the U.S. 
government’s promotion of a sense of true innovative progress in 
American corporations and simultaneously spurn notions of free-riding, 
which have been adopted by some technology-producing corporations. 
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